Michigan Law Review
Volume 64

Issue 5

1966

Schur: Crimes Without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public
Policy
Mauris M. Platkin M.D.
Washington, D.C.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, and the Public Law and Legal
Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Mauris M. Platkin M.D., Schur: Crimes Without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 967 (1966).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol64/iss5/16

This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

March 1966]

Recent Books

967

CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS: DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC
POLICY. By Edwin M. Schur. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc. 1965. Pp. 180. $4.95.

In a broad sense the greatest usefulness of this excellent little
volume is indicated in the first paragraph, indeed in the very first
sentence. Professor Schur states that "much more attention has been
focussed on the deviating individuals than on the social 'definitions'
of the deviants." There is a somewhat familiar ring to this observation; we immediately think of the frequently repeated idea that more
attention is paid to the crime than to the criminal. To a great extent,
however, this is no longer true. Increasing attention has been
directed to the criminal himself; more specifically, an increasing
amount of psychiatric att~ntion has been focussed on the criminal.
The dynamics of his behavior continue to be increasingly examined,
even to the extent that courts and correctional institutions have been
taking a closer look at criminal psychodynamics. For example, in
the District of Columbia, where the Durham Rule is in effect, in
certain criminal cases an .ever-increasing amount of attention has
been given to psychiatric evaluation of the accused.
Now that we have begun to exercise a corrective approach to
crime and the criminal, Professor Schur asks us to go a step further;
we are asked to focus on the social definition of "deviance." We are
asked, that is, to think about the social repercussions on the individual after he has committed a crime: not the sequence of events
after arrest, indictment, trial, and so forth, but the changed relation
between an individual and society that results when the individual
has deviated from expected behavior.
It should be noted that Professor Schur refers to deviance rather
than crime in the quotation above; this is generally the way he
refers to the kind of behavior that is technically referred to as crime.
The orientation here is not simply reference to the commission of
certain proscribed acts, but to behavior that deviates from the norm.
We are asked to go still further and examine the particular forms
of deviance. And in an ironic historical sense we are requested, in
effect, not to allow the concept of deviance to "perpetuate the
preoccupation with deviating individuals" but to examine the social ·
meaning of deviance. In other words, we are going back again to examining the crime rather than the criminal, but we are examining it
now against the social background in which the crime is committed.
Crime-or deviance-has a meaning that varies from place to
place and from time to time. A crime is what society at any given
time and place says it is; a criminal is a person who, in the eyes of
a legally constituted entity, be it a jury or a judge, has committed a
crime. A woman kills her husband's girl friend.and is acquitted by
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a jury; she has not committed a crime. A civil rights worker defends
himself against an unprovoked assault by a native in the State of
Dixie; he is found guilty of assault. A soldier kills an enemy soldier in battle and receives a commendation; after an armistice is
declared he kills another enemy soldier and is charged with murder.
A paranoid person kills another person whom he believes to be
persecuting him with intent to kill; he is acquitted by reason of
insanity. Crime, then, is what we say it is, and what we say it is
largely reflects the moral atmosphere of a given place at a given time.
If these observations are correct, then the role of the sociologist in
the "sociological analysis of certain types of deviant behavior" is
obvious. It is this kind of analysis which Professor Schur directs to
the three types of deviant behavior under discussion in the present
book. These deviations are abortion, homosexuality, and drug addiction. They illustrate, says the author, "a type of unenforceable law."
He refers to them as "crimes without victims"; all are characterized
by the "willing exchange of socially disapproved but widely demanded goods or service." True, not all socially disapproved behavior is criminal, but such behavior as becomes morally repugnant
to the degree that the community wishes to eradicate it is generally
characterized and ultimately codified as criminal.
It is of no small significance that the three types of "crimes" discussed here are generally considered to be highly morally reprehensible to society. They are indeed "crimes without victims"; no one
but the criminal is harmed by the criminal acts. Why, then, are they
crimes? Is it our great philanthropic need to be our brothers' keepers
that urges us to prevent them forcibly from committing acts that we
find so morally repugnant? Is it a lll.oral imperative that we enjoin
upon our brethren to keep their souls pure? What makes us so
insistent on regulating our neighbor's conduct when what he does
"harms" only himself? These are questions that belong well within
the province of the sociologist.
The major portion of this book covers extended reviews of the
three forms of deviant behavior under consideration. In excellent
fashion Professor Schur covers the fields in their legal, social, cultural,
economic, and psychological aspects. Each of the sections includes a
comprehensive bibliography. There is no pretense that the material
is exhaustively covered, but the subjects are treated with sufficient
breadth to give the reader an excellent overview of the subject and
a working understanding of current thinking at various levels about
these problems.
It is of more than passing significance-indeed, it is basic to the
spirit and intent of this book-that none of the three forms of
deviant beha-xior has been significantly controlled by existing legislation. It might be argued that abortion, homosexuality, and drug
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addiction might be far more extensive without existing legislation.
The fact remains, however, that the extent to which they do exist
implies some degree of ineffectiveness in current legislation. It is
because of the nature of these categories of deviance that deterrent
legislation is very largely unenforceable. Since the crimes have no
victims, there is no one to come fonvard to accuse the perpetrators.
No one, that is, except the law itself. Moreover, the fact that the
acts are illegal tends to drive them underground, as it were, so that
they occur in an atmosphere of obscurity, suspicion, guilt, and blackmail. In short, the laws that tend to curb these crimes have not only
been ineffective, but have tended to compound the very crimes they
seek to control.
Professor Schur states that "crimes without victims involve attempts to legislate morality for its own sake." In the last analysis,
of course, this is' what law is all about. Professor Schur goes further,
however, and poses the question whether there is actually any
"victimization" in the particular types of crime discussed in Crimes
Without Victims.
Perhaps the victimization lies in what happens to persons who
commit these crimes. They are forced, as a result of the development
of a deviant self-image, into the subculture which results from the
proscription of the deviant acts. The subcultural worlds of the
drug addict and the homosexual are too well known to need
elaboration here. And since many abortions are unique events in the
lives of the women involved, there is frequently no need to form
the kind of alliances that occur among drug addicts and homosexuals. The moral guilt and the fact of having violated the law are
in themselves severe consequences of abortion, as the author points
out.
There is, however, another subculture which is not touched
upon in this book of which the sociologist, the psychiatrist, and the
criminologist are certainly aware. This is not the subculture to
which the individual is drawn after he has become involved in his
criminal activity, but the one to which he belongs before he enters
his criminal career. Where did he come from, and to what extent
did his community or his subculture contribute to his deviance?
Crime, in the more conventional sense, flourishes among the lower
socio-economic classes. Of the three forms of deviance discussed in
this book, the drug addicts notoriously come from this class. But
homosexuality and abortion cut across all social, cultural, and
economic classes. There is obviously much to be learned.
There is even more to be done. If, as indicated above, current
legislation has been significantly ineffective in controlling these three
forms of deviance, perhaps we ought to rethink this situation, re- evaluate the social significance of these "crimes," and revise our
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legislation. We are currently taking a fresh look at the problems
concerning alcoholism and birth control, and our recent tragic
experience with thalidomide has caused us to reexamine the problem
of abortion. The kind of thinking that is taking place in England
with respect to narcotic addiction and homosexuality is an indication
that we, too, must take another look. In all three cases, public reaction and existing legislation are at least partly based on vital misconceptions about the nature of deviant behavior. Newer knowledge,
newer ideas, and newer understanding about what motivates these
people will, of necessity, serve as a basis for a reevaluation of our
current legislation and punitive approach to the management of
these problems.
"The more constructive sociological task is to try to understand
the behavior in its relation to human needs and social values and
institutions, and to help decision-makers determine which policy
will best maximize social gains and minimize social costs." Morality
is a changing concept, and law· is not inflexible, although sometimes
it appears excessively conservative and unyielding. But if a society
is to consider itself enlightened, it must continually reevaluate its
attitudes. It is not enough to codify and then promptly forget. Just
as the individual must constantly rearrange his thinking in the light
of the day-to-day vicissitudes of experience, so must society continually reconsider its values.
Professor Schur has made a very useful contribution in this
direction. His title, "Crimes Without Victims," is a felicitous one
and epitomizes much of the thrust and significance of this book.
It is a significant contribution to that form of thinking which is a
prerequisite to more enlightened conclusions.

Mauris M. Platkin, M.D.,
Washington, D.C.

